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This week the European Commission issued a Communication about a new framework for protecting the rule of
law within EU Member States.[1]  Is this the long hoped for mechanism that allows the EU to deal with internal
threats to liberal democracy (the democratic deﬁcits within Member States, so to speak) eﬀectively?  The clear-
cut answer is: yes and no.
The Commission has evidently understood that attempts systematically to undermine rule of law principles
require a diﬀerent response than individual infringement proceedings.  Depending on the circumstances, a
structured process of naming and shaming which is now available to the Commission might work.  But if it
doesn’t, then the Commission will remain just as helpless as before: no new sanction mechanisms are
envisaged (and, to be fair, none might be feasible without treaty change).  In that sense, the new framework
formalizes — or, in the words of Commission President Barroso, “consolidates” – the Commission’s de facto
approach in recent years.
This is not a trivial achievement; and it’s probably the most the Commission could do on the basis of existing law
and with available institutions such as the Fundamental Rights Agency.  It may well deter some governments. 
But for illiberal national politicians determined to go head to head with the Commission, there is in the end still
only Article 7 TEU – and that remains as diﬃcult to put into eﬀect as before.
The Commission’s initiative comes against the background of threats to liberal democracy in Hungary and
Romania since about 2010 – and an acute sense among many observers (and also among political actors) that
the Union has been ill-equipped to deal with a challenge one might call “constitutional capture.”  Constitutional
capture is diﬀerent from pervasive corruption (a major problem still in Bulgaria and Romania, for instance); but it
is also diﬀerent from individual rights violations, grave as the latter might be.  Constitutional capture aims at
systematically weakening checks and balances and, in the extreme case, making genuine changes in power
exceedingly diﬃcult. Hungarian Prime Minister Victor Orbán actually passed a new constitution for his country (a
case of formal constitutional capture); his Romanian counterpart Victor Ponta, in the summer of 2012, blatantly
tried to disable checks and balances (the constitutional court in particular) to get rid of his political arch-enemy,
the President of Romania (this being a matter of attempting an informal constitutional capture).
In both cases, the Commission got into a direct confrontation with the respective national governments. While
the EU arguably helped to avoid the worst, the experience seemed to point to a signiﬁcant weakness of the
Commission as a guardian of the treaties: it could take governments to court for individual infringements of EU
law, but it proved incapable of addressing systematic attempts to undermine the rule of law.  In some cases, it
could not “read” certain laws for what they were, but had to reinterpret them in an EU framework such that their
real political meaning was oﬃcially missed.  When Orbán’s government eﬀectively decapitated the Hungarian
judiciary by drastically lowering the retirement age of judges, the EU sued Hungary for age discrimination.
Brussels won its case, but the judges were never re-instated; the political situation remained more or less as
Orbán’s government wanted it.
The Commission now explicitly makes the point that there can be systematic threats to the rule of law within
Member States and that Article 2 TEU gives the Commission, as the guardian of the treaties, the mandate to
intervene.  The Commission also in plain words reiterates the basic legal and normative argument that is crucial
to counter the claim that such an intervention somehow constitutes an illegitimate meddling in internal aﬀairs: the
EU relies on the mutual trust of the Member States in each others’ legal systems; if a kind of “horizontal Solange”
were to replace this trust, the EU as we know it would be at an end. Hence the Commission is spot-on in
stressing that “the conﬁdence of all EU citizens and national authorities in the legal systems of all other Member
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States is vital for the functioning of the whole EU.”
So far, so good.  But what is the concrete content of the new framework?  The Commission envisages a
“structured exchange” with a Member State that appears to be undermining the rule of law. This would start with
an assessment of the situation in a particular country, which could result in a “rule of law opinion” expressing the
concerns of the Commission vis-à-vis the national government in question.  If the government fails to respond
appropriately, Brussels will issue a “rule of law recommendation;” if the state still fails to comply, “the
Commission will assess the possibility of activating one of the mechanisms set out in Article 7 TEU” (which
allows, at the limit, the suspension of a country’s voting rights in the European Council, imposing a kind of
normative quarantine on a Member State).
Three aspects are notable here: ﬁrst, the Commission gives itself leeway to draw on whatever sources it
chooses for its assessment: the Venice Commission, the Fundamental Rights Agency, but also other, as yet
unnamed sources.  This gives it a fair amount of power to come up with a comprehensive judgment – as
opposed to mechanically working through checklists, as has too often been the case in accession processes, or
entirely relying on one institution which the national government under suspicion might try to capture.
Second, the Commission emphasizes the “duty of sincere cooperation” as set out in Article 4(3) TEU. This
clearly reﬂects lessons learnt from the Orbán government’s rush to go ahead with the fourth amendment to the
new Hungarian “Fundamental Law,” when the Commission had asked it to take a pause and talk. A government
acting in bad faith or deﬁance is presumably now more likely to be faced with a “recommendation” and,
ultimately, an attempt to get the European Council to vote for Article 7.
Third, the Commission seems to hope for the eﬀects of a kind of naming and shaming.  The fact of an
assessment and a rule of law opinion will be publicly known, but the content won’t be; in the next step of
escalation, the recommendation as such would be made public.  Clearly, the Commission itself has drawn the
conclusion that its very public conﬂicts with the Hungarian and Romanian governments helped to prevent the
worst.
Will the next Orbán think twice, then?  That’s not obvious. A government intent on constitutional capture knows
that it is on a confrontation course with the EU – and, if anything, will try to mobilize public opinion against
Brussels even preemptively (and not care much about the views of other governments in the EU). Shaming
might sometimes work – but it is less likely to do so in the absence of credible penalties. And in this respect not
much has changed: no new sanctions are envisaged, and the hurdles for Article 7 ultimately remain as high as
before.  To be sure, the Commission might be making a bet that creating a public record of rule of law abuses –
certiﬁed by everyone from the Venice Commission to prestigious judicial networks in the EU – and thus pushing
the European Council on the basis of a “reasoned proposal’ (as the Treaty puts it), would actually shame the
European Council into getting serious about Article 7.[2]  Still, because everything will come down to Article 7 in
the end, it would be a mistake to sit back and relax, in the knowledge that, across the Union, the rule of law will
now be safeguarded by the Commission. Further thinking and further action are needed.
So let me suggest two further thoughts right away. First, if the Commission really were to become more
consciously politicized – appearing as a quasi-government with a recognizably partisan agenda – for the sake of
increasing the Union’s “democratic legitimacy”, then the whole conﬁdent self-presentation of the Commission as
“objective” (something stressed a great deal in the Communication) would become much less credible. A Schulz
Commission might go head to head with an Orbán government, but Orbán’s habitual argument that all criticism
of his government is just a matter of the European Left going after a successful conservative revolutionary might
look a touch more credible in the eyes of observers.
Second, it might be unclear who makes the assessments, crafts the opinions, and issues the recommendations.
Rival proposals – such as my colleague Kim Lane Scheppele’s idea of systematic infringement proceedings or
the creation of a Copenhagen Commission – suggest highly visible (and, ideally, prestigious) actors with a
proven capacity for comprehensive legal and political judgment as ultimately making the calls. To be sure, the
ECJ and a Copenhagen Commission would also be open to charges of partisanship or excessive political
subjectivity, but much less so.  Furthermore, such rival proposals suggest not just intermediate mechanisms
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(intermediate, that is, between soft power, i.e. persuasion, and Article 7), but intermediate penalties.  Any of this,
it seems though, will have to be for the next Commission, and, ultimately, the next treaty.
[1] I am grateful to Gábor Halmai, Dan Kelemen, and Kim Lane Scheppele for comments on a draft of this post.
[2] Thanks to Kim Lane Scheppele for this thought.
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